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B. BELL, HOYT W. BREWSTER, 
KYLE H. BREWSTER, AND LAEL 
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In the Supreme Court 
of th·e Stat.e of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF MAUDE K. BARLOW, ALSO 
KNOWN AS MAUDE KARREN 
RICHARDS, AND MAUDE l(. 
RICHARDS, DECEASED 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ~ 
OF ~1AUDE KARREN RICHARDS, 
DECEASED. 
SHELDON R. BREWSTER, AUDREY 
B. BELL, HOYT W. BREWSTER, 
KYLE H. BREWSTER, AND LAEI_j 
B. GEE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
- vs.-
\"VILijiAl\1 BARLOW, ET AL., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8682 
Case No. 
8683 
Case No. 
8825 
BRIEF OF WILLIAM BARLO·W 
RESPONDENT IN CASE NO. 8682 AND CASE 
NO. 8683 AND DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT IN CASE NO. 8825 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Substantial agreement with the Statement of Facts 
contained in the Brief of Hoyt W. Brewster is expressed 
wjth the exreptions anrl addition~ hereinafter noted. 
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2 
The Trial Court in Case N·o. 8825 by its Judgment, 
(8825 R. 89) found and adjudged that a marriage of 
Maude l{arren Richards and Ben S. Brewster subse-
quent to the date of the execution of their agreement 
and reciprocal wills would not revoke either of their 
reciprocal wills. This belies the staten1ent of Brewster 
that there was uncertainty of such marriage. Such mar-
riage was not doubted before. 
Doubt is noted as to statement that by making on 
September 20, 1952 another Will after her marriage to 
\\Tilliam Barlow, the Decedent named violated her agree-
ment with B·en S. Brewster. Same is a point of law 
to be determined by this Court. Admission is made 
that Decedent did execute such ''Till. 
In Case No. 8825, Appellant made no concession 
that under the facts of this particular case the agree-
ment between the parties ·Should be enforced. In Argu-
ment in Case No. 8683 to the Trial Court same as a 
principle of la\Y had to be conceded and such reason 
therefor \Yill become clear hereafter. In Case N·o. 8825, 
at the Pre-Trial thereof, (8825 R. 62) issue of la\v \Vas 
whether Respondents were entitled to specific perform-
ance of the contract and \Yills. \\~ e believe that this was 
therefore an issue at the Pre-Trial and cannot agree 
with counsel for Bre\vster that it "-as not such issue. 
By its Judgment in Case No. SS25 the Court spe-
·cifi~ally ordered Appellant to deliver to Respondents 
all proceeds he 1nny have recei 'Ted fro1n certain insur-
aneP policies ( 8~:2[l 1~. 89) and to al~o deliYer to Respond-
cnt·s a.ll moneys in joint bank accounts "Tith hitnself and 
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said decedent. (8825 R. 90) However, after Motion ~-,·or 
r~ evv Trial in said case was argued by Appellant (8825 
R. 91), the Trial Court inserted in said Judgment, ''ex-
cept as to any money contributed by William Barlow''. 
(8825 R. 90) No e.vidence was taken by the Court be-
fore entering such J udgn1ent as to the present existence 
of the property vvhich the Trial Court awarded to Re-
spondents. 
lJpon application of Respondents in Case No. 8825, 
Appellant was by Order of the Trial Court (8825 R. 14 
and 15) directed not to move forward to collect and 
receive any proceeds of any insurance policies of de-
cedent and in effect Appellant was directed to let every 
asset remain in status quo. Later, by its Judgment 
(8825 R. 89 and 90), A.ppellant was directed to deliver 
to Respondents that which he was heretofore restrained 
from obtaining. Undoubtedly, proceeds of certain in-
surance policies of decedent have been lost by reason 
of Appellant being restrained from collecting same and 
cannot be delivered to the Respondents. H,owever, the 
Trial Court by its Judgment was not concerned vvith 
the fact that the property existed. No Findings were 
made by the Court and no evidence considered on 
·whether or not the property \vas available. 
Hoyt W. Brewster filed for Probate of V\t..,.ill of de-
cedent in Case No. 8683. Practically simultaneously he 
filed the action, Case No. 8825, for specific performance 
of the \Jlill as a contract. While his Appeals of Cases 
Nos. 8GR2 and 8683 were pending in this Court, he fjled 
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N otiee of Readiness for Trial in No. 8825. (8825 R. 56) 
Appellant filed Objections thereto (8825 R. 57 and 58) 
pointing out that No. 8825 was not at issue until it was 
determined by this Court \\Thich vVill of decedent was 
to be upheld. If "\Vill propounded by Brewster was up-
held by this Court then there ",.as no necessity for pro-
ceeding with his action of Case No. 8825. The vVill of 
decedent w·ould have been acted upon as such Will and 
not as a Contract. However, Hoyt W. Brewster, insisted 
upon such hearing and determination of No. 8825 and 
the net result of the rulings are of his own making and 
inconsistency. 
Reservation is herewith made to state further perti-
nent facts hereinafter should need for same become 
apparent. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE OLO·GRAPHIC 'VILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE 
K. BARLOW, DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1952, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO 
PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
DECEDENT AND WILL OF DECEDENT, DATED FEB-
RUARY 7,1939, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED 
TO PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF DECEDENT. 
POINT II. 
THE C01JRT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT, 
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1957. DECREEING THAT SUB-
SEQUENT MARRIAGE OF DECEDENT AND BEN S. 
BREWSTER DID NOT RE\rOJ{E THEIR AGREEMENT 
AND RECIPROCAL WILLS. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DE-
CREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF RECIPROCAL 
WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS, 
AND AGREEMENT OF SAID DECEDENT AND BEN S. 
BREWSTER. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DE-
CREEING THAT ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY OF DECEDENT AT TIME OF HER DEATH BE 
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Before proceeding with Argument on the Points 
enumerated, Counsel for Appellant state that for clarity 
they deem it wise to firstly dispose ·of which of the Wills 
should have been admitted to probate before proceed-
ing with the problem of ·enforcement of one of the Wills 
as a contract. Also, in the discussion of said Points 
answer will be made to the P·oints stated in Brief of 
Hoyt vV. Bre"\vster, et al., in ·so far as same require such 
answer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE 
K. BARLOW, DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1952, SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AND WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO 
PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF 
DECEDENT AND WILL OF DECEDENT, DATED FEB-
RUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED 
TO PROBATE AS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF DECEDENT. 
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In Case No. 8683, \Vill of decedent, dated F·ebruary 
7, 1939, was offered for probate. In Case No. 8682, Will 
of decedent, dated September 20, 19'52, and Olographic 
in form was offere<d f.or probate. Upon issues being 
joined the problem in both cases to the Trial Court was 
which Will should be admitted to probate as the Last 
Will and Testament of the decedent who despite names 
of Richards and Barlow was one and the same person. 
The Trial Court in No. 8683 entered Judgment (8683 R. 
46) that Will of decendent, dated F·ebruary 7, 1939 was 
expressly revoked by her Will of September 20, 1952 
and denied admission to probate of the Will of February 
7, 1939 and adn1itted to probate the Will of decedent 
dated September 20, 1952 as the Last V\Till and Testa-
n1ent of decedent. The Trial Court in No. 8682 entered 
Judgment (8682 R. 30 and 31) adjudging substantially 
the same. 
This Court in the case of In Re Howard's Estate, 
2 Utah 2d. 112, 269 P. 2d. 1049, has stated that the ulti-
mate issue in a will contest is not to "'hom decedent's 
property should be distributed but is whether the instru-
ment in question is the decedent's last will and testa-
ment. The Trial Court correctly follo,ved this basic 
doctrine announced by this Court. 
In the case of In Re llazce's Estate, 119 Misc. Re .. 
ports, 259, 196 N ... Y. S. ~35, at Page 255 the Court states: 
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"It is now the settled law of this state that 
the prior mutual will cannot be admitted to pro-
bate ;since it is not the last will of the decedent 
and that a subsequent will may be admitted ·subject 
to the rights of the parties to compel a distribu-
tion of the estate under the terms of the contract 
made by the testator.'' 
Page 256: "The authorities hold that the 
determination of the question of whether the 
mutual wills were executed and c-onstituted a con-
tract for the distribution of the property must be 
determined in an action in equity." 
In the case of In Re Burke's Estate, Oregon, 134 P. 
11, at Page 13, the Court states: 
"It is no objection to the probate of a will 
that it violates such an agreement, or revokes a 
former will made in pursuance of it. While such 
former will is revoked as a will, it still stands as 
evidence of the Contract. In fact it has been held 
in some instances that the revoking will must 
fir·st be probated before a suit to enforce spe-
cific performanee of an agTeement under mutual 
,, .. ills ean be enforced.'' 
Appellant cites further authorities. In 69 Corpus 
J~tris, Section 2720, Page 1300, it is stated: 
''A mutual wi1l like any other will is re-
voked by the execution of a subsequent will in-
consistent therewith. So vvhere a party to a 
contract or agreement for mutual wills makes a 
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later will, even without notice to, or the knowl-
edge of the other party, or after the latter's 
death, the mutual will cannot be admitted to 
probate, since it is not the testator's will, and the 
later will may be admitted without regard to the 
fact that it does not comply with the agreement, 
hut it is subject to the rights of interested persons 
to co1npel a distribution of the estate under the 
contract on which the mutual 'vill was founded, 
their remedy being, howe.ver, in equity, and not 
in the probate court, which has no choice but to 
distribute the estate under the last will.'' 
In 69 Corpus Juris, Section 2719, Page 1299, it is 
also stated: 
"Joint and reciprocal "rills, not founded on 
or ·e·mhodying any contract, may like ordinary 
wills, be revoked at pleasure; and so, even after 
the death of one of the makers, and after the 
acceptance of the benefits under his 'vill, the 
survivor may revoke his 'vill or the joint will so 
far as it pertains to his property, but not, of 
course, so far as it pertains to, ·and affects the 
property of the decedent. ~Ioreover, "\\7hile it is 
said that a will executed in pursuance of an 
agreement f.or mutual wills is irrevocable, espe-
cially after the death of one of the parties to the 
agree1nent the true rule is that a mutual " .. ill, 
like every other \Yill, is, as a testan1entary instru-
ment, in its essence and by its .Yery· nature ambu-
lator~:r and re,Tocable throug·h out the lifetime of 
the testator, and that it cannot be 1nade irre-
voeable even by the most express covenant or 
tPrn1s, nlthongh ns a compact it InaY be irre-
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vocable, or enforceable notwithstanding its revo-
cation as a will. So, no estate vests under the 
will of the surviving party to an agre·ement for 
·mutual wills, on the ground of its irrevocability 
after the death of the first maker, all that vests, 
if anything on the death of the first of the 
testators is a right of action to enforce the con-
tract against the survivor". 
In 57 American Jurisprudence, Section 690, Pages 
465 and 466, the following is stated: 
''According to sound theory, one of two 
testators who have made wills which are re-
ciprocal in the circumstances that each will makes 
provision for the testator of the other will may 
revoke his will e.ven after the death of the .other 
testator notwithstanding the wills were drawn 
and executed pursuant to a contract. This does 
not mean that the obligation of the contract is 
escaped by revoking the will. =K• * * Therefore 
a later will which revokes a prior \viii which was 
jointly executed, or one of two separate wills 
containing reciprocal bequests, is admissible to 
probate, though the testator violated his contraet 
by ex·ecuting it; and a jointly executed will or 
one ·of two separate wills which are reciprocal 
in their provisions is not admissible to probate 
as the will of one of the testators who revoked 
it, notwithstanding the revocation was a breach 
of contract. Concisely stated, it is the contract 
and not the joint will \Vhirh is irrevocable after 
the death of a party''. 
Further, in 57 American ,J?J.risprudence, Section 716, 
Pa.gr 485, it is Rtated: 
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''A probate court whose jurisdiction is limited 
to the determination of the issue whether the in-
strument propounded is the last will of the de-
cedent lacks power to enforce an agreement be-
tween tw·o testators to make wills which are 
mutual and reciprocal. The establishment of a 
trust for the purpose of enforcing a contract to 
make wills containing re·ciprocal provisions is 
not ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the pro-
bate or surrogate -court. Generally speaking, the 
remedy of a p.erson injured by the violation of a 
contract for the execution of wills containing 
reciprocal bequests and bequests to third persons 
effective upon the death of the surviving testa-
tor is not to be had in the contest of the probate 
-of the will which constitutes the violation of 
which ·complaint is made, ·Since, in the absen0e of 
a statute, the only issue on a contested probate 
is whether the paper prop.ounded is 'the last will 
of the decedent'. Similarly, a contract jointly 
to execute a single 'vill 'Yhirh is reciprocal in the 
bequests made cannot be asserted as a ground 
for contesting the probate of a later revoking 
will''. 
In Fuller vs. Nelle, 12 Cal. App. ~d. 576, 55 P. 2d. 
1248, at Page 1250, the Court holds: 
'' Follo,ying the doctrine of that case, In Re 
Estntr of ('1arpenter, 104 Cal. _.\pp. 33, at page 34, 
286 P. 348, this Court said: 'This court's action 
\Vas c-orrret. 1\ "~in, though it may be irrevocable 
as a contract, is none the less reYorable as a 
""ill, and in ra~P ~ncb \\"ill is revokPd, th0 injured 
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party cannot contest the later will in the probate 
court on that ground or insist on the pro hate of 
the earlier will but is remitted to an independent 
action at law or in equity to enforce whatever 
rights he may have''. 
Lastly, our Sister State of Idaho in the case of IJf at-
ter of Estate of Isaccson, 285 P. 2d. 1061, at Page 1063 
holds: 
"Although a joint vvill and acceptance of 
benefits thereunder by the survivor ·may, under 
some circumstances, constitute an irrevocable 
contract, such facts do not make the joint will the 
irre.vocable will of the survivor; and his j·oint 
will may be revoked by a later will. Furthermore, 
the question of whether an irrevocable eontract 
exists is not an issue when the later vvill is 
tendered for .probate. * * * The issues ·of whether 
such an irrevocable contract exists and the en-
forcen1ent thereof are matters to be tried out in 
court of equity, and are beyond the equitable 
powers ·of the probate court in probate matters. 
Dewey v. Schrieber lmplem.ent Co. 12 Idaho 280, 
85 P. 9·21; Wilson v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P. 
2d. 409; Ashbarth v. Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P. 
2d. 954, 32 A. L. R. 2d. 361' '. 
Will of decedent, same being Olographic and dated 
September 20, 1952, was by the Trial Court, under the 
authorities and cases cited, properly admitted to probate 
as her I.Jast ''TiB and Testament. Her prior Will of 
February 7, 1939 was properly dPnied probate hy the 
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Trial C·ourt. In filing Case No. 8825, counsel for Brewster 
was fully aware that the v-Vill of decedent he propounded 
to the Court for admission could not be admitted as de-
cedent'~s Last Will and Testament. 
Under the authorities cited, I-Ioyt W. Brewster, had 
no cause of action for specific performance of the \Vill 
until the Probate Court had denied its admission to 
probate. If the Will propounded by him had been ad-
mitted to probate, then necessity for specific perform-
ance w·ould have been alleviated. 
It was a ca.se of first things first and even in la\Y 
logical events follow one after another. B-eing unable to 
take under the \~Vill, I-Ioyt \'\~'. Brewster then "'"as rele-
gated to his remedy in equity for specific performance. 
Under Points \:'I. and VII. in his Brief, Said Brew-
ster, cites the minority eases of In Re Doerfer 's Estate, 
Colorado, 67 P. 2d. 492 and In Re ~\_elkin's Estate, Kansas, 
167 P. 2d. 618, but they are not reconcilable w·ith the 
~\uthorities Appellant has heretofore quoted. Counsel 
for Brewster admit this. Also, p·oint is n1ade that Brew-
ster was denied his Executor's Fees. Truly, this is not 
of import. Also, Sectio-n 15-1-6, U. C .. A .. 1953 is cited 
and quoted for the proposition that a Probate Court ran 
proceed in probate rases to try and detern1ine questions 
of frand ro1n1nitted hy a testator and \vhich 'vas the 
point as to \Yhether or not thi~ Decedent committed 
fraud upon t.hr Respondents by 1naking the later \Yill. 
Thi~ Court hn~ frorn t.in1e \vny back held, and this 
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Court is aware of such holdings, that a Probate Court 
cannot try title to property and such questions as were 
raised by Case No. 8825. It would certainly be an en-
largement of the Statute, supra, if ~such jurisdiction 
were now bestowed on Probate Courts. 
The Trial Court sitting as a Pr·o bate Court prop-
erly refused to consolidate for trial and hearing Case 
N 0. 8825 with c:ases NOS. 8682 and 8683. The Court 
properly heard as a Probate Court said Cases Nos. 8682 
and 8683. Case No. 882:5 f.ollowed thereafter. There is 
no justification for ·clothing the Probate Court with such 
jurisdiction as suggested by counsel for Brewster. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT, 
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1957, DECREEING THAT SUB-
SEQUENT MARRIAGE OF DECEDENT AND BEN S. 
BREWSTER DID NOT REVOKE THEIR AGREEMENT 
P_._ND RECIPROCAL WILLS. 
The parties to such Agreement are long past this 
jurisdiction s-o benefit of theil' testimony was beyond 
the realm of production. I-Io\vever, Respondents never 
once denied that after Ben S. Brewster and ~faude 
I{arren Richards ·entered in to ·such Agreement and made 
such Reciprocal Wills they were ~married to each other. 
ltt this late date such denial or even question of such 
marriage is not permissible. The Trial Court by its 
.Judgment (8825 R. 89) found that such marriage existed. 
The problem is now whether or not the vVill of said 
dercdent, dated February 7, 1939, haYing been properly 
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refused admission to probate ·should be considered as a 
binding contract on the decedent. The issue is further 
complicated by reason of the facts that said parties to 
the agreement ~married each other after they made such 
agreement and such Reciprocal \\'ills including said Will 
of decedent of 1Tebruary 7, 1939. \Vill of Ben S. Brew-
ster, (8825 Ex. 1, R. 60) gave said decedent ·one-third 
of his property and did not mention her as his wife. 
Thereafter, he married her and until date of his death 
he made no other Will and did not make any written 
settlement as required by Section 74-1-25, U. C. A. 1953. 
Section 74-1-25. U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows: 
"Effect of marriage, if wife survives. If 
after making a "\Yill the testa tor marries and the 
wife survives him, the "\\ill is conclusively pre-
sumed to be revoked, wnless provision has been 
made for her either by 1narriage contract, or by 
some written settlen~ent shou._:ing on its face the 
testator's intention to substituie such contract or 
settlement for a provisic·n in her .fapor in his -u·ill, 
or unless she is provided for in the ttcill or in 
such w·ay as to show an intention not to rnake 
such provision; a·nd no· ecidence of other .facts 
to rebut the presun1.ption of revocation can be 
recei1)ed". (Italics ours) 
The "rording of said lTtah Statute is clear and quite em-
phatic. Ben S. Bre'\\Tster did not eon1ply " .. ith it after 
marrying this decerlf'nt. Reason for showing such facts 
are thnt R·rsponde11ts in Onse ~ o. 8825 in th~ir Amended 
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Complaint (8825 R. 39) charge decedent with attempting 
to commit a fraud upon them. If Ben S. Brewster did not 
see fit to comply with the law after he married this de-
cedent, ,surely this decedent had a right to make a later 
Will. 
In Brief of Hoyt v\T. Brewster, under Point I., cases 
cited to the Trial Court by this Appellant in Memoran-
dum submitted to said Court are cited and reviewed. 
Reference is made to Brief of this Appellant so sub-
mitted. (8825 R. 63 to 71) Under said Point I, counsel 
for Hoyt W. Brewster, urge that the Washington rule 
be followed and that the minority opinion of the Cali-
fornia Court in the case of In Re Poisl's Estate, 280 P. 
2d. 789 be adopted. The c·alifornia Statute similar to 
74-1-25, U. C. A. 1953. supra, is as follows: 
''If a pers-on marries after making a will, 
and the spouse survives the maker, the will is 
revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has 
been made for the spouse by marriage contract, 
or unless the spouse is provided f.or in the will, 
or in such way mentioned therein as to show an 
intention not to make such provision, and no 
other evidence to rebut the presumption of rev-
-ocation ran be received". 
Crrli.fornia Probate Code, Section 70. 
In all probability the Utah Statute, supra, was and is 
based upon the California Statute just quoted. In the 
rase of In Rc Poisl's Estat~, 280 P. 2d. 789. Poisl on 
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De·cernher 10, 1950 made a Will leaving personal prop-
erty to Ern·ma Blackburn and referring to her by such 
name. He died on June 16, 1952. Emma Blackburn Poisl 
filed Petition to revoke probate claiming she was the 
wife ·of Poisl and that they were married on July 18, 
1951. The lower court held that provision was made 
for her under the will by reason of the legacy to her by 
name and that the will was not revoked under Section 
70 of the Probate Code. The Appellate Court reversed 
the lower Court and held that the mere naming of a 
woman or giving of legacy to her by name in the will, 
without indicating that she was the testator's prospec-
tive wife, was insufficient to prevent the revocation of 
the '\\:rill as to her by her marriage to the testator after 
the execution of the "rill. The Court stated that the in-
dication that a '\\:roman given a legacy by name in the 
'vill is testator's prospective wife must appear on the 
face of the will to prevent revocation thereof as to her 
by their n1arriage after the execution of the will and 
extrinsic evidence is inadnuss-ible to sho\v the testator's 
intention, at least unless there is so1ne ambiguity~ which 
is not created by legacy to named "~o1nan alone, though 
she is later married to the testator. The Court further 
held that a 'vill must sho"r the testator's contemplation 
of his future 1narriage to eon1ply '-rith the fundamental 
purpose of the statute proYiding that a person's mar-
riage after making a will to one ~urYiYing the n1aker re-
vokes the w·ill as to such spouse unless she is provided 
for in the \vil1. The object of the statutory provision 
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that a person ',s marriage after making a will to one 
surviving the maker revokes the will as to such spouse, 
unless she is provided for in the vvill or so mentioned 
therein a~s to show the testator's intention not to n1ake 
such pro.vision i~s to s-ecure specific moral influence on 
the testamentary act of having in mind a contingent 
event so momentuous as marriage. 
Thusly, there is no doubt that the Brewster VVill 
was revoked since it did not comply with the Statute. 
Irrespective of the views of ·counsel for H·oyt W. Brew-
ster, the ruling of In Re Po~sl's Estate is controlling 
in Case No. 8825 and by reason of the similarity of the 
Utah and California Statutes there is no justification 
for wandering to Washington. 
In the case of In Re Scolpino's Will, 248 N. Y. S. 
634, the New York Court held that the testator's mar-
riage after making a will effected a revocation not-
'vithstanding the giving of a legacy therein to a person 
who afterward became the wife of the testator unless 
the manner of reference to such woman fairly warranted 
the view that the bequest to her iR in her prospective 
status as his wife. 
In the ca~se of In Re Anderson's Estate, Arizona 
131 P. 975, the Court held that under the Civil Code 
providing that, if after making a will the testator mar-
ries and the wife survives, the will shall be revoked, a 
will is revoked by the marriage of the testator after 
executing the will where his wife survives him and no 
provision is made for her in a marriage contract or in 
the wilL 
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In 97 C. J. S. Section 1366 (d), Page 299, it 1s 
stated: 
''According to .some authorities, a statute 
providing that a will shall be deemed to be re-
voked by the ·subsequent marriage of the testa-
tor is applicable to mutual wills and the same 
holding has 'been made without reference to 
statute; and on the marriage ·of one of the parties 
to an agreement for mutual wills, revoking his 
will, the will of the other party is like"rise re-
voked, although he has already died''. 
In 69 C1• J. Sec. 2721, Page 1300, the same state-
ment ap.pears substantially. 
Invitation is made for entire reading of the case 
of In Re Poisl's Estate, supra. It is conclusiYe of the 
point herein. It is controlling. 
In 95 C. J. 8. Sec. 291 (2), Page 76, it is stated: 
"Under a statute declaring that if, after 
making a \Yill, the testator marries and the wife 
survi Yes, the \vill shall be reYoked unless she is 
proyided for ·or 1nentioned in the n1anner indi-
cated by the statute1 in the absence of such pro-
Yision coupled \vi th a failure to mention her as 
indicated, the subsequent n1arriag-e operates as 
a revocation of the testator's \Yill, and in the 
a hsPlH'e of n n~,. proYision in the statute indicating 
that tile \rill of the testator is reYoked pro tanto, 
rP\·oeation hy reason of the subsequent 1narriage 
of the tt'sta tor is absolute and \Yhere the statute 
cl('rlnrP~ t.h:1t no ot.h0r PYidence than that specified 
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in the statute, shall be received to rebut the pre-
sumption -of revocation, except as to such evi-
dence the presumption of revocation is conclu-
sive''. 
Therefore the conclusion must be reached that the 
\"Viii of Ben S. Brewster 'vas revoked and the ruling of 
the Trial Court that it was not was erroneous. 
Under Points III, IV, and V, in his Brief, Hoyt W. 
Bre,vster, asserts that this Appellant is barred from 
questioning the validity of the Brewster vVill and the 
probate thereof; or from contesting the said Will and 
that Appellant is estopped from denying the validity of 
such \Viii. However, this Appellant is not doing so. It 
1nust he noted that this decedent was charged with 
breach of agreement and more or less fraud in Case No. 
8825. If Brewster'.s Will was revoked as a matter of 
law, then that factor must be kept in mind in the de-
termination of whether or not this decedent breached the 
agreement. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DE-
CREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF RECIPROCAL 
WILL OF DECEDENT, MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS, 
AND AGREEMENT OF SAID DECEDENT AND BEN S. 
BREvVSTER. 
Hoyt W. Brewster acted as Executor of the Will of 
Ben S. Brewster along with the decedent, Maude Kar-
ren Richards. (8825 R. 60) He, with knowledge of the 
marriage, propounded to the Probate Court the \Vill of 
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Ben· S. Brewster which he should have known was re-
voked. Surely, H·oyt W. Brewster, does not approach 
the Courts with clean hands but he de1nands that he 
receive equity. Maude Karren Richards received and 
obtained from the estate of Brewster ONE THJRD 
thereof and no more. (8825 R. 60) Respondents now de-
mand the whole and every \Yordly possession of this 
decedent. 
The Reciprocal Will of February 7, 1939 is no fa-
vorite child of the law. In 69 Corp~~rs Juris, Section 2718, 
Page 1299, it is stated: 
"It has been observed, however, that joint, 
mutual, reciprocal, or double wills, while receiv-
ing judicial sanction, are nevertheless 'no fa-
vorite children of the la\v' ". 
This Court speaking in the ease of TT"" ard rs. Tr· ard, 
96 Utah 263, 85 P. 2d. 635, at Page 273, makes the fol-
lo\Ying statement: 
''Under some circun1stances a will 1nay con-
stitute a contract that 1nay be irrevocable; under 
other circumstances it 1nay constitute a contract 
onl~T' and a breach thereof might be measured 
in dan1ages; or in other cases the ,~rill is revocable, 
ambulatory and 1nay be a1uended or chang-ed to 
1neet the n1ind of thP 1nakcr at any time. \\~h_en 
1-l1P \Vill 1s sought to be 1nainb1ined also as a ron-
tr:let, tla"}re 1nnst be sufficient to satisfy the sta-
tn1 (' of frn nfls if the \Yill dor~s not rlo son. 
At Pn.f?.'(\ :274, thi~ c~onrt further sav~: ''Tt 
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is generally held that such contracts will be close-
ly scrutinized and strictly construed''. 
Respondents are not in the position to demand that they 
be, without question, given specific performance of the 
'Vill and Agreement. They have no absolute right there-
to. Courts are not too anxious to uphold such contracts. 
In the case of Florey vs. Meeker, Oregon, 240 P. 2d. 1177, 
in interpreting a joint \Vill the Court held that the will 
did not preclude the surviving testator from substituting 
his second wife as leg a tee after the death of his first 
wife. The Court refused to enforce the Contract in 
favor of the legatees. 
The Trial Court overlooked the foregoing law and 
failed to examine this will and Agreement with "\vatch-
ful eye. Examination of said Agreement (8825, Ex. 1, 
R. 60) reveals that Ben S. Brewster and Maude Karren 
Richards did not contract thereby NOT TO REVOI{E 
THEIR "\\TILLS. There was no such provision inserted 
in said Agreement. This decedent did not agree in writ-
ing NOT to rev·oke the will required of her under said 
agreement. This Court in the case of Ward 'VS. Ward, 
supra, has laid down the proposition that such instru-
ments as we are no\v confronted \Vi th must satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds of this State and must fulfill the re-
quirements of Section 25-5-1, et seq., U. C. A. 1953. This 
Court has not directly ruled on the proposition that such 
Agreement should have, to he enforceable, contained a 
provision not to revoke the ·will. HowPvPr, other Courts 
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when met with such point have ruled that an agreement 
not to revoke a will must be in writing and is within 
the Statute of Frauds. In the case of Carzaurang vs. 
Carrey, California, 4 P. 2d. 259, the Court at Page 261 
says: 
''An agreement not to revoke a will already 
n1ade is just as much an agreement to make 
a provision for another by will as an agreement 
to make a will devising or bequeathing property 
to the pro-misee, and in our opinion the former 
is just as much within the Statute as the latter''. 
In the case of Rubin vs. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 
the Court in discussing Subdivision 7 of Section 31 of 
Personal Property La"r of New York which is similar 
to our Statute states at Page 297 thereof: 
''For the purpose of that statute there can 
be no difference between a -contract 'to bequeath 
property or to 1nake a testamentary provision' 
and a contract to refrain from altering an exist-
ing \vill, for "\Yills are ineffectiYe until the death 
of the testator. (See l\Iatter of LeYin, 302 ~. Y. 
5350.) '' 
In the case of .Jlattcr of Lrrin, 302 K. Y. 535, the Court 
at Page 541 says: 
''Upon fan1iliar practice a n1en1o of a con-
trn(lt required by statute to be in 'Yriting n1ust 
he by and of itself a con1plete expression of the 
intention of thP pn rties "\Yithout reference to parol 
PYidenee (~..'Jtulsaft 1'. ill errer Tube & lllfg. Co. 2SS 
N. v·. 2flrl) ". 
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In c·ase No. 8825, Appellant by his Answer to amended 
C·omplaint of Respondents (8825 R. 44) stated in his 
First Defense that the a·ction of Respondents was barred 
by the Statute of Frauds. The Decedent not having 
agreed in writing to revoke her Will made pursuant to 
said Agreen1ent had a right to do so and by making the 
I_jater vVill she did not breach the Agreement. 
Having married Ben S. Brewster after the execu-
tion ·of said Reciprocal ,~Vilis and Agreement, Respond-
ent upon his death received upon the probate of his 
Will One-Third of his estate ( 8825, R. 60). w·hether 
same was received as his widow or under the Will of 
Ben S. Bre\vster, this Decedent received only what she 
\Vas lawfully entitled to. This Decedent may have, being 
fully mindful of her n1arriage to Brewster, chosen to 
taken under the \Vill instead of under Section 7 4-4-4, 
U. C. A. 1953. In either event she would receive only 
one-third of his estate and that is what she obtained. 
lJnder Point I, IIoyt ,V. Brewster, in his Brief recog-
nizes the right of this decedent to take under Section 
74-4-4, U. C. A. 195.3. This decedent obtained as the 
wife of Ben S. Brewster only what she would have re-
ceived as his wife on his intestacy. 
Respondents' cause of action in Case No. 8825 is 
founded on the breach of agreement by this decedent 
and upon her commission of fraud upon them. The facts 
and the law show that Respondents have no cause of 
action upon such grounds. 
Under Point II, in his Brief, IIoyt ,V. Brewster, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
contends that the Contract was not revoked but since 
the C·ontract contained no provision that D.ecedent would 
not revoke the Will such Contract is not enforceable. . 
The Respondents must have known of the marriage 
of this Decedent to their Father, Ben S. Brewster. They 
were parties to the Probate of his \V.ill and they did 
not grant to this Decedent nothing more than the law, 
itself, "\vould have granted to her. They have suffered no 
loss by the action of this Decedent which they now com-
plain of. 
There is a problem of consideration existing for the 
enforcement of this \~Vill of decedent of February 7, 1939 
and the Agreement. Let same be explored further. Both 
instrun1ents should be integrated and interpreted jointly. 
Courts of Equity scrutinize such instruments Yery care-
fully and are not quick to enforce the same. In the case 
of J(lussman vs. lVessli·ng, 238 Ill. 568, 87 N. E. 544, the 
Court at Page 546 states: 
''Courts of equity look with jealousy upon 
the evidence offered in support of such a con-
tract, and will 'Yeigh such eYidence in the most 
scrupulous manner. * * * Equity "~in not grant 
specific performance of such a contract if it is 
unconscionable, inequitable, or unjust, or unless 
it is founded upon an adequate, sufficient and 
fnir consideration''. 
This Decedent after the 1naking of the ,, ... ills and Agree-
mrnts hnving married Ben S. Rrf\"~Bter and upon his 
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death having obtained only one third of his property 
and only that which she was lawfully entitled to, it is 
not just, equitable, conscionable and fair to enforce the 
Reciprocal Will and Agreement against this Decedent 
and her surviving husband, the Appellant herein. Re-
spondents certainly parted with no consideration for 
their continuance on as beneficiaries of this Decedent's 
estate after the event of the marriage of their father 
to this Decedent and her taking of one third of the 
property of their father as his lawful wife. 
In the case of Bagley vs. Bagley, Oregon, 222 P. 
722, at Page 723, the Court states: 
"The plaintiff's assumption, by virtue of the 
marriage, of the duty she was to perform under 
the first contract, destroyed the consideration 
for the promise to make the will. There then re-
mained no consideration for any contract by 
which she vvould get anything from her husband, 
beyond that inured to her from the marriage. 
In other words, there was a complete super-
session of the first con tract''. 
Said case is the converse of the factual situation herein 
but the decedent would have no right to enforce the Con-
tract if the fact had been reversed. This being so, the 
heirs of Brewster are in no better position. 
The position of Respondents is based upon the as-
sertion that the Decedent committed a fraud upon them 
by reason of her making a Later Will in favor of this 
Appe11ant. They certai'Illy cannot claim financial loss. 
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This Decedent obtained only her lawful share of the 
property of their father. This is not the case of a De-
cedent receiving benefits under the Will and then violat-
ing the Agreement. The benefits this Decedent received 
were those only of the surviving wife of Ben S. Brewster. 
This Decedent received one third of the property but 
Respondents now claim all of her property. Courts con-
sider the consideration involved. In the case of N ott en 
vs. Mensing, 20 Cal. App. 2d. 694, 67 P. 2d. 734, the 
Court in speaking on this issue says : 
Page 698: '' Assunung for the purposes of 
the decision that there was a purported agree-
n1ent between 1fr. and ).Irs. Notten, the question 
arises was the agreement in the instant case one 
which a court of equity will enforce? In Edso·n v. 
Parsons, supra, the Supreme Court of Ke\Y York 
enumerated these rules governing the CDurt. 
It then said, 'These rules require the contrart 
to be certain and definite in all its parts; that it 
be 1nutual, and founded upon an adequate con-
sideration and that it be establish b~· the clearest 
and most convincing evidence. In this state these 
rules are statutory. In J(lussJnan r. n·essling, 
supra, the Supren1e Court of Illinois stated the 
sa111c rule. It there set forth the facts in that 
rase \Yhich ·showed that the surYiYing spouse 
\rould have taken under the hr\\. \Yhat she Yrould 
have takPn under the \rill. The (~ourt quoted 
fron1 Lot"d 1ra1pole ·rs. Lord Orford, 3 \Ts Jr. 
40:!. Tt then added ',,~ c ~l1onld hesitnte, on the 
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evidence in this reeord, to hold that the con-
sideration received by Louise Grimsell under the 
will of her first husband was sufficient to re-
quire the enforcement of the alleged contract as 
to her will of that date'. But the proportionate 
value of the properties of the respective parties 
differed only as to comparatively small sum. 
Whereas in this case, they differed in the pro-
portion of a thousand to one or thereabouts. In 
Haddock v. Knapp, 171 Cal. 59, (151 Pac. 1140) 
the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court in which it refused to compel the per-
formance of a contract to exchange where the 
values stood as $2800.00 to $1400.00 because the 
consideration was not adequate. For this addi-
tional reason we think the trial court did not err 
in denying a decree in favor of the plaintiffs". 
There was no basis in fact and equity for decreeing 
specific performance of the Reciprocal Will of this de-
cedent and the Agreement for the reasons hereinbefore 
pointed out and argued. Under Point II. of his Brief, 
Hoyt W. Brewster, contends that the Contract was not 
revoked. However, under the Authorities herein cited 
such Agreement is not enforceable. Primarily, before 
seeking equitable relief parties must suffer a 'vrong. 
Respondents have not suffered that wrong. True, they 
do not obtain the property of the decedent which they 
have coveted for years. But, other than that Respondents 
have suffered no "\Vrong or injury by reason of the acts 
of this Decedent in leaving her property to this Ap-
pellant who was her dutiful husband for some year.s 
before her decease. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SAID JUDGMENT BY DE-
CREEING THAT ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY OF DECEDENT AT TIME OF HER DEATH BE 
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS. 
This Decedent and Appellant were married on Au-
gust 25, 1952 (8825, R. 70) and on January 20, 1956 this 
Decedent expired. During such period, they being hus-
band and wife, their respective property interests were 
co-mingled undoubtedly. However, the Trial Court by 
its Judgment (8825 R. 88-90) grants to and awards to 
Respondents specific performance of the reciprocal will 
and agreement insofar as the same applies to any and 
all properties described in the instruments or any and 
all assets ·of the estate of this Decedent. (8823, Paragraph 
:1 of Judg1nent, R. 89). In Paragraph 5. (a) of said 
Judgment, (88~3, R. 89) ~\.ppellant is to deli\er all pro-
ceeds from the insnrance policies '\Yith ''·est Coast Life 
Insuranre Con1pany, Businessn1en 's .L\ssurance Company, 
nnd ResPl'\'"e Life Insurance ('iolnpany benefits. By 
Pnragraph 5 (b) of said Judgment (SS~5 R. 90), Ap-
pellant is required to deli, .. er to respondents all n1oneys 
in any bank account, "'"hether held solely or jointly, in 
the na1ne of decedent and specifically any and all moneys 
\vithdra \rn by hiln from any such accounts since the 
dPn t h of deredPnt, cxrept as to any n1oney contributed 
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by Appellant. The portion thereof beginning with ''ex-
cept'' was inserted by the Trial Court after Motion For 
New Trial in said case was argued by eounsel for Ap-
pellant. (8825 R. 91) By Paragraph 5 (c) of said Judg-
ment, (8825 R. 90) Respondents are awarded any and 
all other personal ·or real property of any kind or na-
ture whatsoever and wheresoever located that are a part 
of the estate of Maude Karren Richards. 
The Trial Court took no evidence as to the existence 
,vf the property, vvhether real or personal, which it de-
creed to Respondents. No concern vvas given as to the 
fact that Appellant by Order of the Court (8825 R. 14 
and 15) was directed not to colle-ct and receive any in-
surance policies of decedent. Appellant obeyed this 
Order but yet he is required to deliver the proceeds of 
policies of insurance which he was ordered heretofore 
not to collect. Further, there will of necessity be some 
further litigation in said Case No. 8825 to determine 
which property belongs to whom. Appellant cannot be 
required to surrender his own hard earned dollars to 
Respondents vvhich he with full confidence in his wife, 
the Decedent, placed in their joint account. The J udg-
ment is unconscionable, unjust and inequitable upon that 
score. 
The Agreement, ( 8825 Ex. 1, R. 60) refers to De-
cedent as owning "\Vest Coa.st I_.jife Insurance Policy, 
Businessmen's Assurance Policy, Savings Accounts in 
,,~ alker Bank and Trust Company, FirBt Security Bank 
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and Trust Company, and Zion's Savings Bank and Trust 
Company, A Home and Household Furniture situated 
therein located at 1346 Thornton Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, certain mining .stock in Vanadium Company 
and certain personal belongings. Said Agreement spe-
cifically lists the property of the de-cedent, Maude l{ar-
ren Richards. The Reciprocal \"\ .... ill of decedent, ( 8825, 
Ex. 1, R. 60) itemizes the same property of said decedent 
as set forth in said Agreement. If the Trial Court was 
correct in decreeing specific performance of such Re-
ciprocal ''Till and Agreement, then its Judgment should 
have been confined to the specific items, if proper}~~ 
sho,vn to have been in existence, of property, real and 
personal, as listed in the Reciprocal Will and Agreement. 
There is no general carry all clause whereby decedent 
agrees to give Respondent all of her real and personal 
property owned by her at the time of her decease. Re-
spondents demand and insist that they are entitled to 
and should receive all property of this Decedent and 
even that property acquired after the making of the 
I~eeiprocal \\'"ill and ..._-\_greeiuent and that property ac-
quired h~r Decedent 'Yith this ..._\ppellant. In 97 C. J. S. 
Section 1368, Page 323, it is stated: 
"The makers of a joint and mutual 'vill, or 
of mutual "~ills, have the right and po,ver to pro-
vide that all of the property owned by· the sur-
vivor at hi~ denth shall pas~ under and be bounrl 
hy the tPrnls of their will, but such effect shall 
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not be given to mutual wills unless the intention 
to do so is set forth in the will by very plain, 
specific and unambiguous language. In the ab-
sence of such clearly expressed intention, after 
acquired property owned by the survivor in his 
or her individual right is held not to pass, but 
under other authority, while the terms of the will 
may not be overlooked in considering the ques-
tion as to such after acquired property, it is es-
sentially the terms of the contract which control''. 
Assuming that Decedent had, after making such 
vVill and Agreement, entered the millionaire class or 
that she had entered the destitute class, then what 
property should be covered and subjected to the J udg-
ment of the Court which -decrees specific performance 
of the Reciprocal Will and Agreement~ The only prop-
erty is that specified in the Will and Agreement and 
nothing more. If \vhen enforcement time arrives the 
property exists then the beneficiaries take. If it does 
not ·exist then they do not take. They are in no better 
class than the usual beneficiaries under a Last Will and 
Testament. However, the Trial Court by its Judgment 
herein has made these Respondents preferred to all 
others. 
Under the doctrines of J(lussman vs. ·Wessling, 
supra, and N ott en vs. IJ{ensing., supra, Respondents are 
not entitled -to specific performance of this Reciprocal 
\Vill and Agreement. The Decedent was not unjustly 
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enriched at the loss of Respondents since she as the wife 
of Ben S. Brewster received only \vhat the law would 
have given her. Ho\vever, Respondents stand to be un-
justly enriched at the expense of this Appellant. Ap-
pellant is truly an innocent by-stander to the \Yhole 
transactions between this Decedent, Ben S. Bre\vster and 
the Respondents. Yet, Appellant is subjected to having 
his property given to perfect strangers. Respondents 
are strangers to him and they were certainly not the 
heirs at law of the Decedent. The parties to, including 
the Respondents, the transactions desired that same be 
hush hush but said _.._<\green1ent and \\~ill n1ust be thor-
oughly examined and thi.s .. A .. ppellant as the innocent 
pnrty must be protected in his rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Earh and every Point argued in Brief of Hoyt \Y. 
Brewster, has been ans\vered herein or sho\\11 to be not 
n pplicable. 
In thc.Re cases as consolidated loquaciousness has 
been avoided by counsel for both Respondents and Ap-
pellant and this is co1nmendable in Yie\\~ of the far reach-
ing· effeet of the issues. 
In <Jases 8682 and 8683, t.he Trial Court properly 
ruled au<l the effeet thereof \Yas that the Last \Y.ill and 
ri1PKbl1TICllt of this decedent, Sfilll0 being the ()logrnphie 
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\Vill, dated September 20, 1962, was adn1itted to pro-
bate. In said Cases, under the law and the facts, the 
Trial Court must be upheld in its rulings and judgments. 
In Case No. 8825, under the facts and the law, the 
Judgment of the Trial Court decreeing specific per-
formance should be reversed and the cause remanded 
to the Trial Court with directions to dismiss the action 
brought by Respondent~s with prejudice and upon its 
merits. However, if there be justification determined 
by this Court for the Trial Court decreeing specific per-
formance, then the cause should be remanded by this 
Court to the Trial Court ".,.ith directions to limit such 
specific performance to the items of property, if in ex-
istence, as specified in the Agreement and to free the 
property of this Appellant completely from the effect 
of such Judgment decreeing specific performance in fa-
vor of Re,spondents. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BARCLAY AND BARC·LAY 
Attorneys folf' William Barlow 
109-110-111 Atlas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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